FMEAs for flight hardware, drafted in minutes.

The draft does the typing. Your reliability engineers keep the judgment, the edits and the signature.

Graded against NASA's 1988 review: 10 to 11 of 14 failure modes fully matched in each run.

Rows and scores from the sample report. Review states shown for illustration.

Drafting

Describe the part. Watch the draft build.

Fill in bounded fields: functions, operating environment, materials, interfaces and what a failure means at vehicle level. In Locked mode, only those fields go to the model. Several passes then draft, score and audit.

The Space Shuttle orbiter's fuel-cell hydrogen tank, cut away, with its failure modes pinned to the parts
1Relief valve3 modes, 2 critical
2Quick disconnects3 modes, 1 critical
3Straps3 modes, 1 critical
4Inner vessel1 mode, critical
5Insulation1 mode
11failure modes on the parts in view

21 failure modes. 6 critical. The other 10 sit in parts this view hides: heaters, sensors, the vacuum pump and the supply line.

  1. Relief valve 3 modes, 2 critical
  2. Quick disconnects 3 modes, 1 critical
  3. Straps 3 modes, 1 critical
  4. Inner vessel 1 mode, critical
  5. Insulation 1 mode

Render for illustration. Counts from the sample report. Replay sped up: the real run took 22 minutes 58 seconds.

Drafting: Shuttle hydrogen tank22:58
  1. Read the inputs9 functions with their environment, materials and interfaces
  2. Draft failure modes21 modes, each with an effect chain and causes
  3. Score every modeSeverity, occurrence and detection, each citing a rubric row
  4. Audit the draft18 checks for common FMEA mistakes
  5. Print its own correctionsFixes from the audit stay visible in the report
Draft ready. 21 modes, 6 critical, 4 provisional. Every row stays pending until an engineer reviews it.

Scoring

Every score shows its work

Open any row and see why it scored the way it did: the rubric row behind each number, and what the draft couldn't know.

Row 1 of 3: Relieve overpressure
Tank relief valve fails to open when tank pressure passes the 310 psia setting
CriticalNeeds review
Effect chain
LocalPoppet stays seated while pressure keeps rising
Next levelPressure climbs past the 293.8 psia caution limit
EndInner vessel ruptures: loss of vehicle and crew
Scores and rubric anchors
9

S9 Loss of vehicle, no public risk; or loss of crew

5*

O5 Engineering judgment, no test data

5

D5 Seen in flight on pressure telemetry, no automated response

  • S9 cites its rubric row. Every severity, occurrence and detection score points at the row of the scale it used.
  • O5* is judgment, and says so. With no test history, occurrence never goes below O4 in a design FMEA. The star marks a score without data, and only the engineer can go lower.
  • D5 credits a real control. Detection credit comes only from controls that exist. D3 or better needs a verified one.
  • Critical has a rule. Severity 9 or higher, or RPN 200 or higher with data-backed occurrence. Anything else that scores high is marked provisional, and no failure rate prints without data.

Staying current

Change one input. Only what rested on it goes stale.

Every claim records the inputs it rests on. In the demo project, a fictitious LOX valve, one seat material change flagged 74 of 345 claims. The other 271 stayed current.

Demo: upper-stage LOX isolation valve (fictitious)Review queue
Inputs
Working fluidLOX
Mission phasesground ops, chilldown, ascent, coast
Seat materialPCTFE new polymer
CauseThe PCTFE seat cold-flows under seating loadStale
Occurrence basisSeat life from qualification testingStale
Recommended actionVerify cold leakage with the seat at LOX temperatureStale
ControlSeat leak check after chilldownStale
SeverityLOX leaks into the engine bay: loss of missionCurrent
74 of 345 claims flagged for review, with the reason: input superseded.

Illustration based on the demo project. The claim wording is a summary.

Benchmark

Graded against NASA's 1988 review

The answer key is NASA-CR-185545, the independent review of the orbiter's power reactant storage system. It lists 14 distinct failure modes for the hydrogen tank. The key was written down first, then the same inputs ran three times.

Benchmark: IOA PRSD-200 to 2163 runs
How each of three runs matched the 14 failure modes in the review, by PRSD number
PRSD200201202203-205206207208209210211212213214/215216Result
Run 1200: Fully matched201: Partly matched202: Fully matched203-205: Missed206: Fully matched207: Fully matched208: Fully matched209: Fully matched210: Fully matched211: Fully matched212: Fully matched213: Missed214/215: Fully matched216: Partly matched10 full, 2 partial, 2 missed
Run 2200: Fully matched201: Partly matched202: Fully matched203-205: Missed206: Fully matched207: Fully matched208: Fully matched209: Fully matched210: Fully matched211: Fully matched212: Fully matched213: Fully matched214/215: Fully matched216: Partly matched11 full, 2 partial, 1 missed
Run 3200: Fully matched201: Partly matched202: Fully matched203-205: Missed206: Fully matched207: Fully matched208: Fully matched209: Fully matched210: Fully matched211: Fully matched212: Fully matched213: Missed214/215: Fully matched216: Partly matched10 full, 2 partial, 2 missed
Fully matchedPartly matchedMissed
Missed every run

The display pressure sensor (203 to 205). The draft credited it only as a detection control.

Caught in one run

The relief valve external leak (213), rated criticality 1/1 in both NASA's analysis and the independent one.

Partial every run

The quick disconnect (201), covered when mated but not at mate and demate, and a leak into the vacuum annulus (216).

Beyond the key

The demo run added 9 modes the review didn't list, such as insulation, strap fracture and vacuum degradation. Each one still needs an engineer's judgment.

Sign-off

Your engineer signs every line

Accept, edit or reject each row. At CDR, TRR or LRR, sign-off takes a typed name and zero pending rows. The tool never signs: it records who did and keeps a snapshot, so the next review only shows what changed.

Sample report

Files your reviewers already read

Every draft exports as a PDF marked DRAFT until sign-off, and as a CSV for your own tools. The hydrogen tank report is public.

Page 9 of the sample report, showing the relief valve rows

PDF report

Effect chains, causes and scores for all 21 failure modes, as drafted. Page 9 is the relief valve.

Failure modeSODRPN
Relief valve fails to open above 310 psia95*5225
Quick disconnect fails to stay sealed95*8360
Tension strap or end fitting fractures94*8288
plus 38 more columns

43-column CSV

Every row with its scores, causes, controls and disposition, ready for a spreadsheet or your own tracker.

Free starting FMEA

Send us one part

Describe it in a few lines. You get a drafted FMEA back within a few days for your team to review. No sales call.

New requestDesign FMEA
Opens your email app with everything filled in.